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SYMPOSIUM: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW

THE FUTURE OF DISABILITY RIGHTS
PROTECTIONS FOR TRANSGENDER PEOPLE
Kevin M. Barry & Jennifer L. Levi*
The Americans with Disabilities Act and its predecessor,
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), protect
people from discrimination based on disability, but not if that disability
happens to be one of three archaic medical conditions associated with
transgender people: “transvestism,” “transsexualism,” and “gender
identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments.”1 This
Article tells the story of how this transgender exclusion came to be,
why a growing number of federal courts say it does not apply to gender
dysphoria, a new and distinct medical diagnosis, and the future of
disability rights protections for transgender people.
* Kevin M. Barry, Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law & Jennifer L. Levi,
Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. This Article is the third
in a series of articles tracing the development of disability rights protection for gender
dysphoria. For further information on this topic, see the following articles by the authors:
Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal Protection
Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507 (2016), and Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail,
Inc. and a New Path for Transgender Rights, 127 YALE L.J.F. 373 (2017). For other
foundational articles on this topic, see Christine Michelle Duffy, The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE ch. 16 (2014);
Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender People Through
Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 74-92 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006); Kevin M.
Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for Transgender People, 16
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2013); Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t Make the Man (or
Woman), but Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90 (2006). Thanks to
participants at the SEALS 2018 Conference Workshop on Labor and Employment Law for
helpful conversations; to Michael Morales and Touro Law Review staff for editorial
assistance; and to Tina DeLucia, Carmel Joseph, and Jeff Kaplan for research assistance.
1 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2018); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F) (2018).
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Part I sketches the “matrix” of discrimination that the ADA and
Section 504 were intended to redress: prejudice, stereotypes, and
societal neglect. Part II briefly discusses the discrimination that people
with gender dysphoria—a quintessentially stigmatizing condition—
routinely experience. Part III traces the history of the transgender
exclusion, from its inception three decades ago to its recent decline in
the district courts. Part IV collects every reported case to have alleged
gender dysphoria discrimination under the ADA and Section 504 since
2015—ranging from employment discrimination to prisoners’ rights to
access to insurance and identity documents—and discusses the
potential impact of these cases in redressing the prejudice, stereotypes,
and societal neglect experienced by people with gender dysphoria.
Part V offers some concluding remarks.
I.

A DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION MATRIX

Throughout much of American history, people with disabilities
have experienced systemic discrimination, namely prejudice (animusbased attitudes), stereotypes (overbroad generalizations), and neglect
(historical exclusion).2 They have been hated, stereotyped, and
ignored. Such discrimination is especially pronounced for those whose
medical conditions are stigmatized—those who have been typed as
“abnormal or defective in mind or body” because they “differ too much
from a socially defined ‘norm.’”3
For many years, government policy toward people with
disabilities did not address discrimination; instead, it focused almost
exclusively on vocational rehabilitation designed to help people with
disabilities overcome their limitations, and on benefits entitlement

2 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397,
422-26 (2000); see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(2), 122
Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113) (“[I]n enacting the ADA, Congress
recognized that . . . people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from
[fully participating in all aspects of society] because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the
failure to remove societal and institutional barriers.”).
3 See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 437 (“[P]eople who differ too much from a socially defined
‘norm’ are likely to experience all [three types of discrimination]”—i.e., prejudice,
stereotypes, and neglect); see also Carol J. Gill, Questioning Continuum, in THE RAGGED
EDGE: THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE FROM THE PAGES OF THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE
DISABILITY RAG 42, 44 (Barrett Shaw ed., 1994) (“[D]isability is a marginalized status that
society assigns to people who are different enough from majority cultural standards to be
judged abnormal or defective in mind or body.”).
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programs.4 Beginning in the 1970’s, government policy toward people
with disabilities radically changed with the emergence of the disability
rights movement, which reframed disability as primarily a social
condition.5 According to the “social model” of disability, people are
“disabled” not by the functional limitations imposed by their medical
conditions, but rather by society’s discriminatory reactions—
prejudice, stereotypes, and neglect—toward those conditions.6
Barriers to full participation for people with disabilities, the model
holds, lay not with the individual, but rather with society’s unfair
treatment of the individual.7
As depicted in the diagram below, the ADA and its
predecessor, Section 504, embody this understanding. They prohibit
policies and practices that “disable”—that perpetuate prejudice,
stereotypes, and neglect based on medical conditions.8

4 See Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender People
Through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 78 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006); see
also Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:
What Happened?—Why?—And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
91, 96 (2000) (stating that rehabilitation laws “presumed . . . that integration required changing
the person with the disability, not changing any aspect of the surrounding society that might
have made it difficult for the person to function in that society”).
5 See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 427-30.
6 See Mary Crossley, Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 654 (1999)
(“[T]he disadvantaged status of persons with disabilities is the product of a hostile (or at least
inhospitable) social environment, not simply the product of bodily defects.”); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 41 (1990) (House Committee on Education & Labor) (“The social
consequences that have attached to being disabled often bear no relationship to the physical or
mental limitations imposed by the disability. For example, being paralyzed has meant far
more than being unable to walk—it has meant being excluded from public schools, being
denied employment opportunities, and being deemed an ‘unfit parent.’” (quoting testimony of
Arlene Mayerson of the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund)).
7 See Kevin Barry, Towards Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can
and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 212 (2010) (“Under
the social model, then, disability is not a problem with the individual—it is a problem with our
response to the individual.”).
8 Although it is useful for analytical purposes to think of these three types of discrimination
as being distinct from each other, there is, of course, much overlap among them. Stereotypes,
for example, may be fueled by animus, not ignorance or indifference; and neglect may be
driven by overbroad generalizations about the capacities of certain people.
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The ADA’s text and legislative history confirm this protection from
prejudice, stereotypes, and neglect, as do Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the ADA and Section 504.9
A.

Prejudice

First consider prejudice. The ADA’s antidiscrimination
provisions expressly target animus-based conduct by prohibiting
disparate treatment—intentionally discriminatory actions—such as
categorical exclusion or segregation of people with particular medical
conditions.10 The ADA’s findings acknowledge the persistent and
pervasive history of “unfair . . . prejudice” against people with
disabilities,11 as does the ADA’s legislative history, which is replete
with appalling instances of such prejudice. Examples include a New
Jersey zoo keeper who refused to admit children with Down’s
Syndrome because he feared they would upset the chimpanzees,
operators of an auction house who attempted to remove a woman with
polio because she was deemed to be “disgusting to look at,” a woman
with arthritis who was denied a job at a college because the college
trustees believed that “normal students shouldn’t see her,” and a child
with cerebral palsy who was excluded from public school because his
9

Given Section 504’s lack of legislative history, see, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 295 n.13 (1985) (noting lack of congressional debate devoted to Section 504), and its
nearly identical language to the ADA, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (requiring the ADA to
be construed consistently with Section 504), this Essay’s discussion of legislative history and
text focuses on the ADA, not Section 504.
10 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)-(2), (b)(4) (2018) (Title I); id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)-(C)
(Title III); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)-(2), (d) (2018) (DOJ regulations implementing Title II).
11 42 U.S.C. § 12101(5)-(6), (8) (finding that people with disabilities experience
“prejudice,” “outright intentional exclusion,” and “segregation,” and “occupy an inferior
status”); see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008 , Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(2), 122 Stat.
3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113) (discussing “prejudice” against people
with physical and mental disabilities).
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teacher claimed that his physical appearance “produced a nauseating
effect” on his classmates.12
Supreme Court case law underscores the ADA’s and Section
504’s protection of people who have experienced prejudice based on a
medical condition. In Alexander v. Choate, the Court located the roots
of Section 504, in part, in the “well-catalogued instances of invidious
discrimination” against people with disabilities.13 And in his
concurring opinion several years earlier in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, a case in which the Court invalidated a zoning
ordinance that discriminated against people with intellectual
disabilities in violation of equal protection, Justice Thurgood Marshall
vividly recounted this history of prejudice.14 People with intellectual
disabilities, he explained, “have been subject to a ‘lengthy and tragic
history’ . . . of segregation and discrimination that can only be called
grotesque”—a “regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation
. . . that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the
worst excesses of Jim Crow.”15 Widely considered to be a “menace to
society and civilization,” people with intellectual disabilities were
housed in “[m]assive custodial institutions” designed to “halt [their]
reproduction” and “extinguish their race.”16
B.

Stereotypes

Beyond prejudice, the ADA targets conduct based on
stereotypical assumptions. The ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions
12 Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications
of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 418-19 (1991).
13 469 U.S. 287, 295 n.12 (1985).
14 See 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
15 Id. at 461-62 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
16 Id. at 462. Because Cleburne’s facts centered on people with intellectual disabilities,
Justice Marshall’s stirring portrait of discrimination did not include other forms of statesanctioned discrimination against people with disabilities, including the institutionalization of
people with a range of conditions other than intellectual disabilities, such as epilepsy and
blindness; the passage of state “ugly laws” that prohibited “unsightly” people—including
people with disabilities—from appearing in public; and a built environment that excluded
people with disabilities, quite literally, at every step—from the sidewalks encircling their
homes to the stairs leading up to the U.S. Capitol. See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 440-41; see
also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 113 (1997), https://ncd.gov/publications/2010/equality_of
_Opportunity_The_Making_of_the_Americans_with_Disabilities_Act [hereinafter EQUALITY
OF OPPORTUNITY] (describing Capitol steps as “a symbol of discrimination against the
disabled” (quoting Michael Auberger, co-founder of ADAPT)).
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prohibit overbroad rules and qualification standards that have a
disparate impact—a “discriminatory effect”—on people with medical
conditions, screening them out from opportunities enjoyed by those
without a medical condition.17 The ADA’s findings recognize the
pernicious role that “overprotective rules and policies,” “exclusionary
qualification standards and criteria,” and “antiquated attitudes” have
had in denying people with medical conditions equal opportunity.18
And the ADA’s legislative history contains numerous examples of
disgraceful actions taken against people with disabilities based on
“false presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing
attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious mythologies,”19
including: a man with AIDS who was forced by police to remain in his
car overnight as neighbors peered at him through the car’s windows; a
woman who was fired from a job she had held for many years because
her son, who lived with her, had contracted AIDS; people with epilepsy
who were believed to be possessed by the devil and shut out of schools
and the workforce; a woman with HIV whose use of a community
swimming pool led the town to close the pool for a week and prompted
a neighbor to start a petition demanding that she move out of the town;
and fully-registered people with disabilities who were turned away

17 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3), (b)(6) (2018) (Title I); id. § 12182(b)(1)(D),
(b)(2)(A)(i) (Title III); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3), (b)(8) (2018) (DOJ regulations implementing
Title II).
18 42 U.S.C. § 12101(5); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(2),
122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113); see also Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(7) (1990) (finding that people with
disabilities have been subjected to discrimination based, in part, on “stereotypic assumptions
. . . not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in and
contribute to society”) (removed from ADA by 2008 amendments).
19 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 30 (1990); see also id. at 40 (discussing “stereotypical
assumptions, fears and myths [about people with disabilities] not truly indicative of the ability
of such individuals to participate in and contribute to society”); accord S. REP. NO. 101-116,
at 6 (1989), https://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OSEC/library/legislative_histories/1387.pdf
(Senate Committee of Labor and Human Resources). According to Senator Tom Harkin:
There is a wellspring of fears and unfounded prejudices about people with
disabilities, unfounded fears, whether people have mental disorders,
whether they are manic depressives or schizophrenia or paranoia, or
unfounded fears and prejudices based upon physical disabilities. The point
of the [ADA] is to start breaking down those barriers of fear and prejudice
and unfounded fears, to get past that point so that people begin to look at
people based on their abilities, not first looking at their disability.
135 CONG. REC. S10765-01, S10768, 1989 WL 183216 (Sept. 6, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Harkin).
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from voting booths because they did not look sufficiently “competent”
to vote.20
Numerous Supreme Court decisions support the ADA’s and
Section 504’s mandate to address harmful stereotypes. In 1987, in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,21 the Supreme Court
concluded that Section 504 protected a school teacher with
tuberculosis who was discharged from her job because of others’ fears
that she might be contagious.22 “[T]he basic purpose of § 504,” the
Court concluded, “is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not
denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the
ignorance of others”—including “society’s accumulated myths and
fears about disability and disease.”23 “[D]iscrimination on the basis of
mythology,” the Court explained, “[is] precisely the type of injury
Congress sought to prevent.”24 Negative stereotypical reactions,
themselves, disable.
Arline’s observations concerning society’s “accumulated
myths and fears” about disability also find expression in Justice
Thurgood Marshall’s concurrence in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center. According to Justice Marshall, people with intellectual
disabilities were “categorically excluded from public schools, based
on the false stereotype that all were ineducable and on the purported
need to protect [non-disabled] children from them.”25 State laws
deemed them unfit for citizenship, disqualified them from voting,
compelled their sterilization to stop them from procreating, and made
their marriages voidable and even criminal.26 Although much has
changed for people with intellectual disabilities, Justice Marshall
explained, this long history of “social and cultural isolation” has
resulted in “ignorance, irrational fears, and stereotyping” that continue
to endure—“stymie[ing] recognition of the[ir] dignity and
individuality.”27
20 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 56-57; 136 CONG. REC. S7422-03, S7444, 1990 WL
144937 (June 6, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin); EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 16;
accord S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 5-7.
21 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
22 Id. at 281.
23
Id. at 284; see also id. at 283 (stating that the ADA covers those who experience “negative
reactions . . . to the impairment”).
24 Id. at 285.
25 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 462-63 (1985).
26 Id. at 463-64.
27 Id. at 464, 467.
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions confirm the law’s
protection of people with medical conditions from harmful
stereotypes. In Bragdon v. Abbott,28 the Court held that the ADA’s
definition of “disability” covered a woman with HIV whose dentist
refused to render services out of fear of infection—a position shared
by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and every other agency and court
that had considered the issue under Section 504.29 In Olmstead v. L.C.
ex rel. Zimring,30 the Court held that unnecessary institutionalization
of people with various mental impairments violated the ADA, in part,
because it “stigmatiz[ed]” them, “perpetuat[ing] unwarranted
assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of
participating in community life.”31 And in Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett,32 Justice Kennedy observed that the
ADA prohibits actions based not on “malice or hostile animus alone,”
but also
insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational
reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard
against people who appear to be different in some
respects from ourselves. Quite apart from any historical
documentation, knowledge of our own human instincts
teaches that persons who find it difficult to perform
routine functions by reason of some mental or physical
impairment might at first seem unsettling to us, unless
we are guided by the better angels of our nature.33
C.

Societal Neglect

Lastly, the ADA targets the neglect of people with disabilities,
whose “[e]xclusion is literally built into our physical and social
environment.”34 Take, for example, buildings inaccessible to people
who use wheelchairs, workplaces that do not permit job coaches for
people with mental health conditions, and paper money
indistinguishable to a person who is blind. Throughout history, these
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

524 U.S. 624 (1998).
Id. at 628-29, 642-45.
527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Id. at 600 (citation omitted).
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
Id. at 374-75 (Kennedy & O’Connor, JJ., concurring).
Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 425.
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“[societal] norms have arisen out of the cumulative set of actions and
decisions” taken by members of the majority—“with any
disadvantages resulting to other members of society largely ignored
and unacknowledged.”35
The ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions address society’s
historical neglect of people with disabilities by requiring universal
design and the removal of architectural barriers,36 reasonable
accommodations in the workplace,37 and reasonable modification of
policies, practices, and procedures in government and private
business.38
The ADA’s findings likewise acknowledge the
“isolat[ion]” and “inferior status” of people with disabilities, their
“relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or
other opportunities,” and society’s “failure to make modifications to
existing facilities and practices” and to “remove societal and
institutional barriers.”39
Societal neglect of people with disabilities also features in the
ADA’s and Section 504’s legislative history, as well as in Supreme
Court decisions interpreting these laws. According to one of the
ADA’s lead sponsors, Senator Tom Harkin, the ADA “offers promise
that [people with disabilities] will no longer be shunned and isolated
because of the ignorance of others.”40 Rather, according to President
George H.W. Bush, who signed the ADA into law, people with
disabilities will have “the opportunity to blend fully and equally into
the rich mosaic of the American mainstream.”41 As the Supreme Court
stated in Alexander, Congress viewed discrimination against people
with disabilities as “most often the product, not of invidious animus,
but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect,”
35 Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons From Religion, Disability, Sexual
Orientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L. REV. 159, 182 (2002); see also id. at 181
(“Admittedly, these decisions were not taken out of malice or hatred for minority members of
society.”).
36 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v), 12183 (2018) (Title III); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.150,
35.151 (2018) (DOJ regulations implementing Title II).
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (Title I).
38 See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (Title III); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (DOJ regulations
implementing Title II).
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(2), (5); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §
2(a)(2), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113).
40 136 CONG. REC. S7422-03, S7444, 1990 WL 144937 (June 6, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Harkin).
41 Remarks of President George Bush at the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/videos/ada_signing_text.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2018).
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“apathetic attitudes,” and “shameful oversight[].”42 Section 504, the
Alexander Court stated, was intended to remedy the “invisibility of
[people with disabilities] in America,” who were forced “to live among
society ‘shunted aside, hidden, and ignored.’”43 Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg have likewise discussed the “indifference” toward people
with disabilities and “systematic exclusion” that motivated passage of
the ADA.44
II.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH GENDER
DYSPHORIA

Gender dysphoria is a rare but serious medical condition
characterized by a marked incongruence between one’s assigned sex
at birth and one’s gender identity, which results in clinically significant
distress.45 Without treatment, adults with gender dysphoria experience
serious psychological debilitation (e.g., anxiety, depression, suicidality
and other mental health issues).46 Fortunately, gender dysphoria is
curable by medically-recommended and supervised gender transition,
which alleviates the distress caused by gender dysphoria and allows
one to live a life consistent with one’s gender identity. The medical
care for the condition is individualized and consists of one or more of
four components: living consistent with one’s gender; hormone
therapy to bring a person’s body into conformity with their gender
identity; surgery to change primary and/or secondary sex
characteristics; and psychotherapy.47
People with gender dysphoria routinely face discrimination
based on their medical condition and the medical services and
treatments they use to treat it. Specifically, they are subject to
relentless prejudice, in the form of animus-driven exclusion and
segregation; stereotypical assumptions, fears, and pernicious myths, in

42

Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985).
Id. at 296 (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 45974 (1971)).
44 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 536 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Bd. of Trs. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
45 AMERICAN P SYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 452, 454 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
46 See id. at 454-55.
47 WORLD PROF. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH
OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 9-10 (7th ed. 2011),
https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/Web%20Transfer/SOC/Standards%20of%20
Care%20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH.pdf [hereinafter SOC].
43
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the form of overbroad rules and qualification standards that screen
them out; and neglect, in the form of refusals to modify policies to
permit equal participation.
Indeed, gender dysphoria is a
quintessentially stigmatizing medical condition—one that is subject to
pervasive and persistent discrimination because those with the
condition are “not considered to be among the ‘normals’ for whom
society, and its institutions, are designed.”48
According to the American Psychiatric Association, gender
dysphoria:
is associated with high levels of stigmatization,
discrimination, and victimization, leading to negative
self-concept, increased rates of mental disorder
comorbidity, school dropout, and economic
marginalization, including unemployment, with
attendant social and mental health risks, especially in
individuals from resource-poor family backgrounds.49
The internationally accepted Standards of Care for the treatment of
gender dysphoria, published by the World Professional Association for
Transgender Health (“WPATH”), similarly recognize the risk of
“abuse and stigmatization” of people with gender dysphoria.50
Gender dysphoria’s close association with transgender
people—an “historically persecuted and politically powerless” class
who “face discrimination, harassment, and violence because of their
gender identity”—likewise contributes to the discrimination faced by
people with gender dysphoria.51 Take, for example, the experience of
Gavin Grimm and Ash Whitaker, both transgender students, who were
48 See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 437; see also Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir.
1992) (noting “the social stigma attached” to “transsexuality”); Lie v. Sky Publ’g Corp., 2002
WL 31492397, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2002) (denying employer’s motion for summary
judgment under Massachusetts’ ADA-like, three-pronged definition of disability, and stating
that “[i]t cannot be gainsaid that transsexuals have a classically stigmatizing condition that
sometimes elicits reactions based solely on prejudices, stereotypes, or unfounded fear”).
49 DSM-5, supra note 45, at 458.
50 See SOC, supra note 47, at 21.
51 Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d
1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 176 (2017); see generally
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER
SURVEY 4 (2016), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-ReportFINAL.PDF (surveying nearly 28,000 transgender people and concluding that they are
disproportionately at risk for discrimination in almost all aspects of life, including
employment, housing, education, public accommodations, and access to government
services).
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told by their high school principals that they could not use genderappropriate restrooms because it would violate “the dignity and
privacy rights of other students” and would create “safety issues and
lewdness concerns.”52 Consider also the experience of current and
aspiring transgender military service members who were told by the
President of the United States that they were no longer welcome in the
military because they were a “burden[]” and a “disruption.”53 Or
consider state and local laws that once criminalized cross-dressing in
public “to prevent crimes in washrooms; and . . . to prevent inherently
antisocial conduct which is contrary to the accepted norms of our
society.”54
Notwithstanding the discrimination routinely experienced by
people with gender dysphoria, few litigants with gender dysphoria
have claimed the protection of the ADA and Section 504. Part III
explains why this is so, and why this is now changing.
III.

THE HISTORY OF THE TRANSGENDER EXCLUSION

The history of the ADA’s and Section 504’s transgender
exclusion begins in the late 1980’s with the successful legislative
efforts of several conservative senior U.S. senators, who sought to strip
legal protections for medical conditions closely associated with
transgender people. Approximately twenty-five years later, the
pendulum has swung, as transgender litigants with the new and distinct
diagnosis of gender dysphoria successfully claim the protection of the
ADA and Section 504.
A.

The Making of the Transgender Exclusion: 19871990

The ADA’s predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act, originally
protected people with transgender-related diagnoses from
discrimination, as demonstrated by a pair of federal district court cases
from the mid-1980’s. In Doe v. United States Postal Service,55 the U.S.
Postal Service revoked a transgender woman’s conditional job offer
52
Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d
850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016); accord Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1052.
53 Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 183.
54 City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524 (Ill. 1978); Doe 1 v. McConn, 489 F.
Supp. 76, 80 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
55 Civ. A. No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 9446 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985).
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after she disclosed her intent to undergo gender reassignment
surgery.56 Describing the case as a “sad” one, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia denied the United States Postal
Service’s motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiff, who had a
“medically and psychologically established need for gender
reassignment surgery,” had stated a claim for disability discrimination
under the Rehabilitation Act.57
Similarly, in Blackwell v. United States Department of the
Treasury,58 a Treasury Department supervisor canceled a job vacancy
just hours after interviewing the plaintiff, a transgender woman,
notwithstanding her priority hiring credentials (she had worked for
nearly ten years in other branches of the Treasury Department and had
been laid off due to a reduction in force) and the recommendation of
an experienced, competent interviewer that the plaintiff be hired.59
According to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, the Treasury Department’s actions were “highly
reprehensible”; the Department supervisor “knew [the] plaintiff could
56

Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *1. At the time the Doe v. USPS case was decided, “transsexualism” was used by
medical and non-medical communities interchangeably with the diagnosis of GID. Compare
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 261-66 (3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-3] (using “transsexualism” to refer to the
diagnosis of GID in adults and adolescents; children with GID received a diagnosis of “GID
of Childhood”), with Christine Michelle Duffy, The Americans with Disabilities Act of1990
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16-48 (2014) (“It was not
uncommon at the time [the ADA was being debated] for people to use the terms
‘transsexualism’ and ‘GID’ interchangeably.”). Transsexualism was removed from the DSM
in 1994 and is no longer identified as a medical condition in the DSM. See AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
532-38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (combining the diagnoses of “Transsexualism”
and “GID of Childhood” into the single diagnosis of “GID in children and in adolescents or
adults”). The International Classification of Diseases (“ICD”), published by the World Health
Organization, has traced a similar path, originally using “transsexualism” to refer to the
diagnosis of GID in adults and adolescents, and later substituting “gender incongruence” for
“transsexualism” in the most current edition of the ICD, the ICD-11, published in June 2018.
ICD-11 FOR MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY STATISTICS, GENDER INCONGRUENCE (Dec. 2018),
https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en#/http%3a%2f%2fid.who.int%2ficd%2fentity%2f411470
068; see Jack Drescher et al., Minding the Body: Situating Gender Identity Diagnoses in the
ICD-11, 24 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 568, 568-69 (2012) (providing history of gender identity
diagnostic classification). The word “transsexual” is fading out of general use, but it describes
a person who has or will undergo gender transition and it has been used interchangeably with
the word transgender. See DSM-5, supra note 45, at 451.
58 656 F. Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 830 F.2d
1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
59 Id. at 714-15.
57
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do the job and had no sound basis for even refusing to accept him for
the job.”60 Following a bench trial, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia concluded that the plaintiff had a medical
condition that was protected under the Rehabilitation Act,61 but
ultimately ruled against the plaintiff because she had not shown that
she was refused hire on that basis.62
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) objected to courts’ recognition of
transgender-related medical diagnoses as protected disabilities under
the Rehabilitation Act on moral grounds. In 1987, during Senate
debate on a bill to override President Ronald Reagan’s veto of the Civil
Rights Restoration Act—which expanded the scope of coverage of the
Rehabilitation Act and several other federal antidiscrimination
statutes—Helms cited the Blackwell case in an attempt to defeat the
override.63 According to Helms, civil rights laws should not prohibit
private institutions [that receive federal financial
assistance], particularly schools and day care centers, .
. . from making employment decisions based on moral
qualifications. . . . [T]his bill opens the way for private
institutions all over the country to find themselves
forced to justify exclusion of various behaviorally
handicapped persons from benefits by evidence from

60

Id. at 715.
Id. (using the language of “transvesti[sm]” to refer to the plaintiff). “Transvestite” and
“transvestism” are derogatory terms that were often used historically to refer to transgender
people. See HR Compl. ¶ 185, Tips for Managing GLBT in the Workplace, 2015 WL 8495422;
see generally Dallas Denny, Transgender Communities, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 184 (2006)
(distinguishing “transgender” from labels such as “transvestite” that were “bestowed by the
medical community and are in a sense slave names”). At the time of the Blackwell case, these
words were used by non-medical communities interchangeably with “transsexual” and
“transsexualism.” It is clear from the facts of Blackwell that the plaintiff had undergone gender
transition and was transgender. According to the court, in addition to dressing in female attire,
the plaintiff “had foam implanted in h[er] breasts, and ha[d] effected other changes in h[er]
physical appearance,” including “female dress and adornments.” Blackwell, 656 F. Supp. at
714.
62 The court held that the plaintiff was fired not because of a transgender-related medical
condition, but rather because of her sexual orientation. Id. at 715 (stating that the Department
supervisor “found plaintiff’s apparent homosexual aspect undesirable and changed the rules
to avoid the inevitable administrative hassle that would occur if he declined a qualified
applicant who was carrying priority hiring credentials because of the RIF.”).
63 See Ruth Colker, Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
8 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 33, 37-39 (2004) (discussing legislative history of Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987).
61
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medical doctors and other experts, but not from morals
or theology.64
Although Helms lost this argument when Congress passed the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 over the President’s veto, he
returned to the issue the following year. In 1988, during Senate debate
on a bill to amend the Fair Housing Act to prohibit housing
discrimination based on disability status, Helms successfully argued
for the bill’s exclusion of protection of conditions associated with
being transgender.65 After reciting the facts and holding of the
Blackwell case, in which the court recognized Section 504’s protection
of people with transgender-related medical conditions, Helms quipped
that his amendment would “put a little common sense back into the
equation.”66 The amendment, which excluded transgender-related
medical conditions from both the Fair Housing Act and Section 504,
passed overwhelmingly.67
Senator Alan Cranston, a principal author of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and one of only two senators to oppose the Helms
amendment, rose in objection.68 Cranston argued that the Helms
amendment was fueled by moral animus against transgender people
and was at odds with the purpose of the law. “I see this amendment,”
he stated,
as a direct attack on the heart and soul of
antidiscrimination laws, which protect individuals
against discrimination based on stereotypes.
In 1973 when section 504 was enacted, Congress
recognized that a great deal of the discrimination facing
disabled individuals is not the inevitable result of their
handicapping condition, but, rather, arises out of the
64

134 CONG. REC. S2399-02 (Mar. 17, 1988) (statement of Sen. Helms), 1988 WL
1084657.
65 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(b)(3), 102 Stat.
1619, 1622 (1988) (codified as a note to 42 U.S.C. § 3602) (excluding coverage of
“transvestites”); see also Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights
Protection or Transgender People, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. J. 1, 15 n.62, 25 n.132 (2013)
(discussing legislative history of Fair Housing Amendments Act); Colker, supra note 63, at
39 (same).
66 134 CONG. REC. S10,470 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) (on
file with author).
67 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, § 6(b)(3) (excluding coverage of
“transvestites”); 134 CONG. REC. S10,471 (noting 89-2 Senate vote in favor of amendment).
68 134 CONG. REC. S10,470-71 (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston).
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false perceptions and prejudices that others hold about
individuals who have those conditions. The clear
congressional intent was to sweep broadly—to change
attitudinal barriers which had served so unfairly to
deprive disabled persons of the rights and opportunities
afforded to other Americans.
…
This amendment would single out one category of
individuals who are already being discriminated against
and say to them, “Sorry you now have no protections.
Congress has decided that it no longer cares whether or
not you are cast out of our society.”69
The Helms amendment, Cranston concluded,
could open the door to any number of attempts to
exclude other disabilities from this and other
antidiscrimination laws. . . . [T]he whole purpose of . .
. antidiscrimination laws is to provide across-the-board,
evenhanded protection, not to pick and choose
disabilities we approve of and exclude the ones we
don’t.70
Senator Cranston’s insight proved prescient. In 1989, during
Senate debate on the ADA, Helms successfully proposed an identical
amendment that excluded transgender-related medical conditions from
the bill’s protections.71 William Armstrong, a conservative senator
from Colorado, further proposed to exclude a broad list of mental
health conditions.72 In negotiations over Armstrong’s amendment, the
list was eventually whittled down to approximately eleven conditions,
which included kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance
abuse disorders resulting from illegal drug use; sexual behavior
69

Id.
Id.
71 42 U.S.C. § 12208 (2018); 135 CONG. REC. S10,776 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), 1989 WL
183216 (noting passage of amendment no. 716).
72 135 CONG. REC. S10,753-54 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. William
Armstrong), 1989 WL 183115; see also 135 CONG. REC. S11,175-76 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989)
(statement of Sen. William Armstrong), 1989 WL 183785 (discussing excluded conditions).
70
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disorders, such as pedophilia, exhibitionism, and voyeurism; and three
conditions associated with transgender people: transvestism,
transsexualism, and gender identity disorders.73
Armstrong’s
amendment, co-sponsored by Senator Orrin Hatch, passed the Senate
and, with several modifications at conference, became law.74 Two
years later, Congress passed an identical exclusion to the
Rehabilitation Act.75
As was the case with the exclusion of transgender-related
conditions from Section 504 and the Fair Housing Act, legislative
history reveals that the ADA’s exclusions were based on the moral
opprobrium of several senior senators. Senator Armstrong “could not
imagine the [ADA’s] sponsors would want to provide a protected legal
status” to people with mental health conditions that “might have a
moral content to them.”76 According to Senator Helms, the ADA
exclusions were needed because “moral standards” should allow
employers to disfavor certain medical conditions.77 And Senator
Warren Rudman characterized the excluded conditions as “socially
unacceptable behavior” that “lacks any physiological basis. In short,
we are talking about behavior that is immoral, improper, or illegal and
which individuals are engaging in of their own volition.”78
By contrast, disability and lesbian-gay-bisexual rights activists
had deep misgivings about the ADA exclusions, particularly its three
transgender-related exclusions. EEOC Commissioner Chai Feldblum,
who was a staff attorney with the ACLU AIDS Project at the time,
originally resisted negotiating with Armstrong and instead advised the
bill’s sponsors to put Armstrong’s amendment to a vote, which she
73

Barry, supra note 65, at 24 (discussing negotiation of Armstrong’s amendment).
42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1); 135 CONG. REC. S10,785 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (noting
passage of amendment no. 722). The House of Representative’s version of excluded
conditions explicitly characterized the three transgender-related conditions as “sexual
behavior disorders,” inserted the words “not resulting from physical impairments” after
“gender identity disorders,” and removed the exclusion of “current psychoactive substanceinduced organic mental disorders.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-596, at 88 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 597, 1990 WL 121679. This version of excluded conditions was accepted
at conference. Id.
75 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F) (2018) ; H.R. REP. NO. 102-973, at 158 (1992), 1992 WL 322488
(discussing amendment of Rehabilitation Act).
76 135 CONG. REC. S10,734 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. William Armstrong).
77 135 CONG. REC. S10,772 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms).
78 135 CONG. REC. S10,796 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Warren Rudman).
This debate was eerily similar to the “moral standards” arguments subsequently made during
the debate over the passage of DOMA and thereafter rejected as an acceptable basis for
legislating by the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor. 570 U.S. 744, 770-71 (2013).
74
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predicted would fail handedly.79 When Senator Hatch demanded that
Feldblum give him “more” conditions to add to the negotiated list, she
reluctantly agreed.80 Similarly, Peri Jude Radecic, lobbyist for the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force at the time of the ADA’s
passage, supported the ADA’s exclusion of homosexuality and
bisexuality, but stated that, “as far as the other categories are
concerned, I think that anytime that people are removed from
protections, I don’t necessarily think that’s a good situation. I’m not
happy anyone is excluded from the bill.”81 And, according to Professor
Bob Burgdorf, who drafted the original version of the ADA in 1988 as
a staffer for (what was then known as) the National Council on the
Handicapped, the ADA exclusions were “wholly inconsistent with the
overall tenor of the Americans with Disabilities Act,” reflecting those
“preconceived assumptions and stereotypes” that the ADA was
intended to dismantle.82
B.

The Transgender Exclusion, the ADA
Amendments Act, and the DSM-5: 1990–2014

In the years following the ADA’s passage, several transgender
litigants who experienced employment discrimination on the basis of
gender identity disorder (GID) and transsexualism sought protection
under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. None were successful. In each
case, the district court ruled against the plaintiffs by invoking the
transgender-related exclusions with little or no elaboration, and
without reference to the constitutional dimensions of the exclusions—
including the moral animus underlying them.83
Although the transgender-related exclusions effectively
prevented transgender litigants from challenging disability
discrimination under federal law for nearly three decades, disability
discrimination challenges under state law have often been successful.
79

Barry, supra note 65, at 23-25 (discussing legislative history of ADA’s transgender
exclusion).
80 Id. at 24.
81 Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber Left the Road: The Use and Misuse of History in the
Quest for The Federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 18 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV.
397, 436 n.199 (2009).
82 See Burgdorf Jr., supra note 12, at 452 & 519; see also id. at 519 (“[I]t is arguable that
the members of Congress relied upon nothing other than their own negative reactions, fears
and prejudices in fashioning the list of excluded classes.”).
83 See Duffy, supra note 57, at 16-45 to 16-48 (discussing cases decided between 1994 and
2004).
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Approximately forty-three states have adopted disability
antidiscrimination laws that track the ADA definition of disability
virtually verbatim.84 Notably, only ten of these states have imported
the ADA’s transgender exclusion.85 In the remaining forty states with
no transgender exclusion in their disability antidiscrimination laws, a
majority of courts and state agencies that have addressed the issue have
held that GID and transsexualism are protected disabilities under state
antidiscrimination laws.86 In 2001, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits,87 for
example, the Superior Court of Massachusetts held that a transgender
female high school student who was prohibited from wearing genderappropriate clothing to school stated a claim for disability
discrimination under the Massachusetts constitution.88 Such a result,
the court reasoned, reflected the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’
“proud and independent tradition in protecting the civil rights of its
citizens”—particularly those with “traits that ma[k]e them
misunderstood and despised.”89
In 2008, Congress amended the ADA by abrogating a series of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that unduly narrowed the ADA’s
definition of disability contrary to legislative intent.90 Specifically,
through its findings, purposes, and revised definitions, the ADAAA
rejected: the “demanding standard for qualifying as disabled” erected
by the Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams; the requirement of the Court in Sutton v. United Airlines,
Inc. (and its companion cases) that courts consider the ameliorative
effects of medication and other measures in assessing the limitations
imposed by a medical condition; and Sutton’s narrowing of the ADA’s
capacious third prong, which covers those “regarded as” having a

84 Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal
Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 523 (2016).
85 Id.
86 See Duffy, supra note 57, at 16-111 to 16-124 (comparing favorable judicial and
administrative decisions in Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, and Washington, with adverse decisions in Iowa and Florida); see also id. at 16123 (discussing Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission’s January 2011 amicus brief in
Stacy v. LSI Corp., which argued that Pennsylvania’s antidiscrimination law does not exclude
gender identity disorders).
87 No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 36648072 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001).
88 See id. at *5.
89 Id.
90 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113).
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disability.91 As clarified by the ADAAA, the ADA requires
employers, state and local governments, and private businesses to
reasonably accommodate a person with a medical condition that is
actually limiting or that would be limiting, absent treatment.92 The
ADA further prohibits employers, state and local governments, and
private businesses from engaging in all other types of discrimination
against a person with a real or perceived medical condition, regardless
of whether the condition is or would be limiting.93 Importantly,
because the Supreme Court has never interpreted the ADA’s
transgender exclusion, the ADAAA did not address the exclusion—
much less remove it.
In 2013, the American Psychiatric Association (APA)
published the fifth edition of its authoritative treatise, the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), which replaced
the diagnosis of “gender identity disorders” with “gender dysphoria.”94
This replacement was more than semantic, reflecting a substantive
difference between the medical conditions themselves.
Unlike the outdated diagnosis of gender identity disorder,
which the APA first introduced in the DSM in 1980, the hallmark or
presenting feature of gender dysphoria is not a person’s gender
identity.95 Rather, it is the clinically significant distress, termed
dysphoria, that people experience as a result of the mismatch between
a person’s gender identity and their assigned sex.96 Reflecting this
distinction, the diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria in the DSM-5
are different than those for gender identity disorder. For example, the
criteria for gender dysphoria, unlike gender identity disorder, include
a “posttransition specifier for people who are living full-time as the
91 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2018) (expanding “regarded as” prong); id. § 12102(4)(B)
(citing ADAAA’s findings that, in turn, reject “demanding standard”); id. § 12102(4)(E)
(determining disability without consideration of ameliorative effects of mitigating measures).
92 See id. § 12201(h) (requiring showing of substantial limitation of major life activity in
reasonable accommodation cases); id. § 12102(4)(E) (prohibiting consideration of
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures in determining substantial limitation of major life
activity).
93 See id. § 12201(h) (requiring no showing of substantial limitation of major life activity
in non-reasonable accommodation cases).
94
DSM-5, supra note 45, at 452-53.
95 See DSM-5, supra note 45, at 452-53, 814-15.
96 See
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, GENDER DYSPHORIA 2 (2013),
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gend
er-Dysphoria.pdf (stating that gender identity disorder connoted “that the patient is
‘disordered’”).
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desired gender . . . modeled on the concept of full or partial
remission.”97 Thus, there are people with gender dysphoria—namely,
gender dysphoria posttransition—that would not meet the criteria for
gender identity disorder because their distress associated with having
a gender identity not typically associated with their assigned sex has
been ameliorated by their having undergone gender transition.98
Furthermore, the diagnosis of gender dysphoria in the DSM-5 rests
upon a growing body of scientific research showing that gender
dysphoria has a physical cause related to the interaction of the
developing brain and sex hormones.99
C.

Challenging the Transgender Exclusion: 2014-2017

In 2014, in the case of Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc.,100 a
transgender woman diagnosed with gender dysphoria challenged
workplace discrimination under Title VII and the ADA.101 When her
employer moved to dismiss the ADA claim based on the ADA’s
transgender exclusion in 2015, Ms. Blatt advanced three distinct
theories for why the exclusions violated equal protection.102
First, she argued that the exclusions should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny because discrimination based on transgender
status is a suspect/quasi-suspect classification under the Supreme
Court’s four-factor test: transgender people have suffered a history of
discrimination; transgender status does not affect a person’s ability to
participate in society; it is a core aspect of a person’s identity,
unchangeable, and impervious to external influences; and transgender

97

DSM-5, supra note 45, at 814-15.
See id.
99 See id. at 457 (discussing possible genetic and physiological underpinnings of gender
dysphoria); see also Duffy, supra note 47, at 16-72 to 16-74 & n.282 (citing numerous medical
studies conducted in past eight years that “point in the direction of hormonal and genetic
causes for the in utero development of gender dysphoria”); Second Statement of Interest of
the United States at 5, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL, 2015 WL 9872493
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2015) (discussing “the evolving scientific evidence suggesting that gender
dysphoria may have a physical basis”).
100 No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL, 2017 WL 2178123 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017).
101 See id. at *1-2.
102 See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Partial Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 14-4822, 2015
WL 1360179, at *17-39 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2015), [hereinafter Blatt Br. in Opp’n]. For further
discussion of the constitutional issues at issue in this case, see generally Barry et al., supra
note 84.
98

46

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

people are a minority lacking political power.103 Significantly, Ms.
Blatt was among the first to argue that discrimination based on
transgender status constitutes a suspect/quasi-suspect classification.104
She would not be the last, as demonstrated by recent litigation
challenging the Trump administration’s ban on transgender service
members and cases challenging transgender discrimination by
states.105 Second, and relatedly, Ms. Blatt argued that the ADA’s
exclusions should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because
transgender discrimination is necessarily sex-based: it reflects sex
stereotypes and is also based on a person’s change of sex or assigned
sex at birth.106 Under either theory, Ms. Blatt argued, the exclusions
failed heightened scrutiny because there was no compelling or

103 See Blatt Br. in Opp’n, supra note 102, at 18-26; see also Barry et al., supra note 84, at
550-67 (arguing that transgender discrimination is entitled to heightened scrutiny based on
Supreme Court’s four-factor test).
104 Prior to this time, equal protection challenges to transgender discrimination alleged that
such discrimination was based on “sex” and was therefore entitled to intermediate scrutiny.
See Barry et al., supra note 84, at 568 (discussing cases holding that transgender discrimination
is sex discrimination in violation of equal protection).
105 See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 208-09 (D.D.C. 2017), vacated by Doe
2 v. Shanahan, No. 18-5257, 2019 WL 102309 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 2019) (concluding that
“transgender individuals . . . appear to satisfy the criteria of at least a quasi-suspect
classification,” and applying “intermediate level of scrutiny” to President Trump’s transgender
military ban because “discrimination on the basis of someone’s transgender identity is a quasisuspect form of classification that triggers heightened scrutiny”); Evancho v. Pine-Richland
Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (concluding that “all of the indicia for
the application of the heightened intermediate scrutiny standard are present” for transgender
individuals, and applying “an intermediate standard of Equal Protection review” to school
policy that prohibited students from using restroom consistent with their gender identity);
accord Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d
850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Adkins v. City of N.Y., 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y.
2015); see also Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 524 n.8. (D. Conn. 2016).
106 See Blatt Br. in Opp’n, supra note 102, at 28; see, e.g., Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v.
Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying
“heightened review” because school district’s bathroom policy, which required transgender
students to use the bathroom consistent with the sex listed on their birth certificates, was
“inherently based upon a sex-classification”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316, 1319
(11th Cir. 2011) (affirming trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of transgender
employee because “discriminating against someone on the basis of his or her gender nonconformity constitutes sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause” and is
therefore “subject to heightened scrutiny”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th
Cir. 2004) (holding that transgender employee’s “claims of gender discrimination . . . easily
constitute a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause”); Doe 1,
2017 WL 4873042, at *27-28 (applying “intermediate level of scrutiny” because transgender
discrimination is “a form of discrimination on the basis of gender, which is itself subject to
intermediate scrutiny”); see also Barry et al., supra note 84, at 567-73 (arguing that
transgender discrimination is entitled to heightened scrutiny because it is sex-based).
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important reason to exclude transgender people from the ADA’s
protections.107
Lastly, Ms. Blatt argued that the ADA’s transgender exclusion
failed even the most deferential level of scrutiny—rational basis—
because it was rooted in moral animus against a disfavored group.108
Such a bare desire to harm, she argued, cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.109
In a detailed legal memorandum sent to Attorney General Eric
Holder, six state and national transgender rights organizations urged
DOJ to take the position that the ADA’s transgender exclusion was
unconstitutional.110 The Blatt case “presents the right vehicle at the
right time to challenge the constitutionality of the [ADA’s transgender
exclusion],” the memorandum stated.111 “A quarter century after [the
ADA’s] adoption,” the memorandum continued, “is long past the time
for a court to strike this pernicious exclusion and clear the way for
transgender people to enjoy the same protections under the law that
other people with profound health conditions, whether stigmatized or
not, currently enjoy.”112
In an amicus brief filed two days later, these transgender rights
organizations advanced an alternative, statutory argument: the court
could avoid the constitutional issue by construing the ADA’s
transgender exclusion to apply only to GID and not to gender
dysphoria—a new and distinct diagnosis with physical roots.113
In response to the Notice of Constitutional Question filed by
Ms. Blatt pursuant to Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
DOJ under Attorney General Loretta Lynch urged the court to avoid
107

Blatt Br. in Opp’n, supra note 102, at 28-34.
See id. at 34-39; see also supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text (discussing ADA’s
legislative history).
109 See Blatt Br. in Opp’n, supra note 102, at 35; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
634-35 (1996) (concluding that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest”—much less a compelling or important one)
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (alteration in original));
Barry et al., supra note 84, at 574-77 (discussing transgender exclusion’s roots in moral
animus).
110 Memorandum from Jennifer Levi, Dir., Transgender Rights Project, Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defs. et al., to Eric Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice et al. (Jan.
21, 2015) [hereinafter Levi Memorandum] (on file with authors).
111 Id. at 1.
112 Id. at 5.
113 See Brief of Amici Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders et al. in Opposition
to Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss at 11, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv4822-JFL, 2015 WL 1322781 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2015).
108
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addressing the constitutionality of the ADA’s GID exclusion by first
resolving Ms. Blatt’s Title VII claims.114 When the court determined
that the constitutional issue could not be avoided,115 DOJ filed a
supplemental statement of interest on November 16, 2015 that reached
the same result as amici, albeit by slightly different means.116 Gender
dysphoria is not distinct from GID, DOJ argued, but emerging science
indicates that gender dysphoria is a GID that results from a physical
impairment (i.e., neurological, genetic, and/or hormonal sources) and,
therefore, does not fall within the exclusions.117
Over a year and a half later, on May 18, 2017, the court in Blatt
denied Cabela’s motion to dismiss the ADA claim.118 Rather than
adopting amici’s or DOJ’s statutory argument in favor of ADA
coverage for gender dysphoria, the court settled on a third
interpretation. According to the court, “gender identity disorder,” as
used in the ADA, refers simply to transgender identity (i.e., “the
condition of identifying with a different gender”)—not to medical
conditions like gender dysphoria that transgender people may have.119
The ADA does not protect transgender identity (i.e., gender identity
disorder), but it does protect gender dysphoria, which is a serious
medical condition.
On July 17, 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice under
Attorney General Jeff Sessions filed a statement of interest in a
separate case, Doe v. Arrisi, supporting coverage of gender dysphoria
under the ADA.120 “[B]ecause Plaintiff has alleged that her GD
114 Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No.
5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. July. 21, 2015).
115 Order, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2015).
116 Second Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail,
Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2015).
117 Id. at 5 (“In light of the evolving scientific evidence suggesting that gender dysphoria
may have a physical basis, along with the remedial nature of the ADA and the relevant
statutory and regulatory provisions directing that the terms ‘disability’ and ‘physical
impairment’ be read broadly, the [ADA’s exclusion of gender identity disorders not resulting
from physical impairments] should be construed narrowly such that gender dysphoria falls
outside its scope.”).
118 Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
May 18, 2017). For further discussion of this case, see generally Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi,
Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. and a New Path for Transgender Rights, 127 YALE L.J.F. 373,
385 (2017) (discussing Blatt’s holding).
119 Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123; see also id. at *3 n.3 (likening “gender identity disorder” to
“homosexual[ity] or bisexual[ity],” none of which are medical conditions covered by the
ADA).
120 Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Doe v. Arrisi, No. 3:16-cv-08640,
at 2-3 (D.N.J. July 17, 2017) [hereinafter Arrisi Stat. of Int. of U.S.].
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resulted from a ‘physical impairment,’” DOJ stated, “by definition she
has alleged that she falls within the statutory protections of the
ADA.”121 Three months later, DOJ filed a nearly identical statement
in yet another case, Doe v. Dzurenda.122 Notwithstanding multiple
opportunities to reverse course in recent months, DOJ has not done so.
Instead, for over three years, and under two separate administrations,
DOJ has supported ADA coverage of gender dysphoria as a matter of
statutory interpretation.
Significantly, throughout this time, DOJ has never argued that
Congress’s purported exclusion of gender dysphoria would be
constitutional, nor has it articulated a legitimate purpose that could be
advanced for its exclusion.123 On the contrary, when explicitly invited
by courts to defend the constitutionality of the exclusion, DOJ
expressly declined to do so.124 Tellingly, no defendant has attempted
to defend the constitutionality of the ADA’s transgender exclusion
either.125
On December 8, 2017, transgender rights and disability rights
advocates and lawyers, including those who identified as both
transgender and having a disability, as well as those who identified as
neither transgender nor having a disability, met in New York to discuss
Blatt’s implications.126 The discussion was wide-ranging, but three
broad themes emerged.
The first was an acknowledgment of the importance of
disability rights protection for gender dysphoria. Like Senator Alan
Cranston thirty years ago, some participants emphasized the

121

Id. at 3.
Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Doe v. Dzurenda, No. 3:16-CV1934, at 3 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2017).
123 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ’s intervention in
support of ADA coverage of gender dysphoria).
124 Compare, e.g., Order Certifying Constitutional Question to Attorney General of the
United States, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, at 1 (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2018), with
Notice by the United States of Decision Not to Intervene to Defend Constitutionality of a
Federal Statute, Doe v. Mass., No. 17-12255, at 1 (D. Mass. May 30, 2018).
125 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Doe v. Mass., No. 17-12255, at 18 (D. Mass. Feb. 21,
2018) (“Defendants take no position on the constitutionality of the ADA and defer to the
United States Attorney General’s position regarding the constitutionality of the federal
statute.”).
126 All references to discussions at the December 8, 2017 meeting are drawn from a
memorandum on file with the authors, dated December 12, 2017, summarizing that meeting.
122
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importance of equal access to civil rights laws.127 It would have been
discriminatory for Congress to exclude Tay-Sachs Disease from the
ADA out of animus toward Jewish people, or sickle cell anemia out of
animus toward African American people. So, too, with gender
dysphoria; it was discriminatory for Congress to exclude various
medical conditions associated with transgender people based on
animus toward them.
Other participants emphasized the importance of disability
rights protection for gender dysphoria by noting the overlapping
systems of oppression and shared experience of stigma among people
with disabilities and transgender people. For example, “ugly” laws
once prohibited people with disabilities from participating in public
life, while laws criminalizing cross-dressing did the same to
transgender people. Both groups have experienced a tragic history of
forced medical treatment, such as compulsory sterilization of people
with disabilities and the use of conversion therapy on transgender
people. People with disabilities continue to experience physically
inaccessible restrooms, while discriminatory state bills advance laws
that would prohibit transgender women from using women’s restrooms
and transgender men from using men’s restrooms. And both groups
have experienced exclusion from service in the military based on
treatable medical conditions.
Still others noted the important gaps in antidiscrimination
statutes that disability rights law can fill, including protection from
discrimination in public accommodations, protection from
discrimination in government facilities such as prisons, the
requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodations such
as medical leave or modified work schedules, and protection from
associational discrimination.
Several participants also noted objections raised by nontransgender allies to disability rights coverage for gender dysphoria
(e.g., “Why would you want to be protected by the ADA?”), and stated
that these objections, while perhaps well-intentioned, reflected
paternalism toward transgender people and prejudice toward people
with disabilities.
A second theme was a recognition that disability advocacy
involves navigating contradictory disability models. For example, in

127 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing Sen. Alan Cranston’s
objections to Sen. Jesse Helm’s amendment to the Fair Housing Amendments Act).
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order to obtain social security disability benefits, a person must
advance a stigmatizing “medical model” of disability by arguing that
the medical condition, itself, “disables” the person, rendering the
person unable to work. Under this model, which reflects the most
common understanding of disability, the word “disability” connotes a
medical condition that limits bodily functions. By contrast, when
invoking the protections of disability antidiscrimination laws like the
ADA or Section 504, a person advances a more empowering “social
model” of disability by arguing that one is able to work or eligible to
receive a service in spite of a medical condition, but is “disabled” by
others’ prejudicial, stereotypical, or neglectful attitudes and actions.
Under the social model, “disability” connotes oppression, not an
inability to function. Participants noted that, although some disability
laws rely on a stigmatizing definition of “disability” rooted in the
medical model, laws like the ADA and Section 504 do not; they are
instead premised on the social model and are vital to securing rights
for people who experience discrimination based on a medical
condition.
One participant captured disability law’s contradictory models
in the statement of a man living with HIV in the late 1990’s, at the time
that Bragdon v. Abbott—which established ADA coverage of HIV—
was pending before the Supreme Court.128 “I have HIV,” the man said,
“but I’m not disabled.” What the man probably meant was that he was
capable of working and was therefore not “disabled” for purposes of
social security law. But if he, like the plaintiff in Bragdon, were
refused services by a dentist based on irrational fears about HIV, the
man would have been “disabled”—and therefore protected from
discrimination—under the ADA. As with HIV, effective advocacy on
behalf of people with gender dysphoria requires a thoughtful
understanding of the promise and perils of both models of disability
law.
A third theme was a recognition of beneficial collaborations
that have already taken place between disability rights and LGBT
rights organizations (e.g., HIV/AIDS advocacy and, more recently,
transgender autistic advocacy), and a commitment to further
collaboration regarding disability rights coverage for gender dysphoria
and other matters at the intersection of transgender and disability
rights. Notwithstanding perceived differences between disability and
128

524 U.S. 624 (1998).

52

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

transgender rights organizations (e.g., “LGBT groups have more
money and greater success in the courts”; “Disability groups have
bipartisan support and greater success in Congress”), the two groups
have much in common, and the communities they serve overlap—
namely, transgender people with disabilities, who are among the most
marginalized in our society.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF DISABILITY RIGHTS PROTECTIONS FOR
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE

As a result of the Blatt litigation, transgender litigants have
challenged discrimination under the ADA and Section 504 in a broad
range of settings. At the time of this writing, there are at least fifteen
pending or recently decided cases under the ADA and Section 504
alleging discrimination based on gender dysphoria. As depicted in the
figure below, these cases are of three varieties—employment, prisoner
rights, and insurance and identity documents—and loosely represent
the three primary types of discrimination that people with disabilities
typically experience: prejudice, stereotypes, and neglect.129

In nearly every case, the defendant(s) invoked the ADA’s and/or
Section 504’s transgender exclusion to dismiss the claim.130 A brief
129 For illustrative purposes, the following groups of cases are organized around one of the
three types of discrimination. In reality, nearly all cases involve all three types of
discrimination.
130 Several defendants, including the United States in Doe v. United States, and Wal-Mart
in Bost v. Sam’s East, Inc., did not invoke the transgender exclusion. See, e.g., Defs.’ Br.
Supp. Part’l Mot. Dismiss, Bost v. Sam’s East, No. 1:17-cv-1148, at 2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 15,
2018) [hereinafter Defs.’ Br., Sam’s East]; Fed’l Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 1, Doe v.
U.S., No. 3:16-cv-0640 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016). In fact, in Bost v. Sam’s East, Inc., the
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description of each case follows, together with noteworthy
developments.
A.

Employment Discrimination

The first type of case involves employment discrimination
under Title I of the ADA. In the following cases, transgender
employees experienced daily insults and indignities on the job after
undergoing transition. These cases best illustrate the rank prejudice
that transgender people often experience: offensive name-calling,
intentional misgendering, denial of gender-appropriate services, and
outright exclusion. Because the ADA, unlike other civil rights laws,
requires reasonable accommodations in the workplace, the potential
impact of the following cases could be significant for employees with
gender dysphoria—particularly, those who need to modify their work
schedule or take leave to seek counseling, hormone therapy,
electrolysis, surgery, or other treatment.131
1.

Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc.

In Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., Kate Lynn Blatt, a transgender
woman, brought suit under the ADA after experiencing daily insults
and indignities as a merchandise stocker at a popular sporting goods
store.132 According to her complaint, coworkers at Cabela’s called her
“he/she,” “fag,” “freak,” and other humiliating names, and store
management refused the very modest accommodations she
requested.133 Cabela’s would not issue her a female uniform or a
nametag bearing her female name.134 It refused to allow her to use the
female employee washroom and required her to use the single-person
bathroom at the front of the store—after originally suggesting that she
defendant, Wal-Mart, explicitly conceded that gender dysphoria is not excluded by the ADA.
See Defs.’ Br., Sam’s East, supra, at 2 (distinguishing gender dysphoria from transsexualism
and GID).
131 See 42 U.S.C. 12111(9) (2018) (defining “reasonable accommodation” under ADA); see
generally U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#leave
(discussing types of reasonable accommodations under ADA).
132 First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶¶ 13-36, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No.
5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2014). Ms. Blatt also sued under Title VII. Id. ¶ 2.
133 Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 21, 26, 33.
134 Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 32.
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use the bathroom at a Dunkin Donuts across the street.135 Cabela’s also
unfairly disciplined Ms. Blatt and, after just six months on the job,
abruptly fired her.136
Blatt settled in 2017 after the district court’s landmark decision
holding that gender dysphoria is protected by the ADA.137
2.

Parker v. Strawser Construction, Inc.

In Parker v. Strawser Construction, Inc., Tracy Parker, a
transgender woman who worked as a truck driver, sued her employer
for violating the ADA.138 Like Ms. Blatt, Ms. Parker experienced
relentless taunts from coworkers who mocked her appearance, stating
that she “ma[d]e for an ugly woman.”139 Ms. Parker was also unfairly
disciplined, denied access to a gender-appropriate bathroom,
repeatedly misgendered (including in her termination letter), and
sexually assaulted by coworkers and management who asked her to
perform sexual favors.140
On April 25, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiff’s ADA claim on grounds that
“gender dysphoria . . . is expressly excluded from the definition of
‘disability’” under the ADA.141 In reaching this result, the court
rejected the holding of Blatt, finding “no support” for Blatt’s
determination that the ADA protects “disabling” GIDs but not “nondisabling” GIDs.142 The Parker court’s analysis of Blatt is mistaken.143
Blatt did not say that some GIDs are “disabling” and protected,
and other GIDs are “non-disabling” and excluded, as the Parker court

135

Id. ¶¶ 19, 28-31.
Id. ¶¶ 34-36.
137 Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa.
2017); see also supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text (discussing Blatt).
138 First Amended Complaint for Damages Jury Demand Endorsed Herein ¶¶ 34, 221-34,
Parker v. Strawser Construction, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-541 (S.D. Ohio. July 17, 2017). Ms. Parker
also sued under Title VII and state law. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.
139 Id. ¶¶ 58-60, 80-82.
140 Id. ¶¶ 47-169.
141 Parker v. Strawser Construction, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 744, 753-54 (S.D. Ohio 2018)
(“Congress intended to exclude from the ADA’s protection both disabling and non-disabling
gender identity disorders that do not result from a physical impairment.”).
142 Id. at 754.
143 For a correct interpretation of the Blatt case, see generally Barry & Levi, supra note 118
(discussing Blatt’s holding); see also supra notes and accompanying text (discussing Blatt).
136
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suggested.144 Rather, Blatt said that gender dysphoria is different than
GID: gender dysphoria refers to a medical condition that is protected,
and GID—as used in the ADA—refers to transgender identity (not a
medical condition) that is excluded.145 The Parker court reached the
wrong result because it erroneously conflated gender dysphoria and
GID; Blatt correctly determined that the two are not the same.
Unfortunately, because the plaintiff in Parker did not plead that gender
dysphoria results from a physical impairment, the plaintiff’s ADA
claim could not survive under this alternative argument advanced by
DOJ in other cases and adopted by the court in Doe v. Massachusetts
Department of Correction (discussed below).146
Because the Parker court did not dismiss the plaintiff’s federal
and state sex discrimination claims, this case remains pending.
3.

EEOC v. Deluxe Financial Services, Inc.

In EEOC v. Deluxe Financial Services, Inc., the EEOC filed
suit against one of the largest check printers in the U.S. for a broad
range of discrimination against Britney Austin, a transgender
employee.147 The defendant refused to permit Ms. Austin to use a
gender-appropriate restroom, citing “consideration” of “other
employees”; refused to change internal documents to reflect Ms.
Austin’s correct name and sex designation; intentionally misgendered
Ms. Austin; and made repeated, derogatory jokes and comments about
Ms. Austin’s appearance, including calling her names like “Tarzan”
(to tease her about her hairiness and clothes) and openly laughing at
her at meetings.148
Significantly, EEOC’s complaint alleged only sex
discrimination.149 When the employee, Britney Austin, intervened in
the lawsuit, she alleged disability discrimination as well, and also
challenged, among other things, her employer’s maintenance of an
144

See Parker, 307 F. Supp. 3d at 753.
See Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2, 4 (construing “gender identity disorders” under the
ADA “to refer to only the condition of identifying with a different gender,” and contrasting
this term with the medical condition of “gender dysphoria”).
146
See Parker, 307 F. Supp. 3d at 755; see also supra notes 99, 117, 120-22 and infra note
174 and accompanying text.
147 Complaint at 1, EEOC v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 0:15-cv-02646, 2015 WL
3636151 (D. Minn. June 4, 2015).
148 Id. ¶¶ 33-73.
149 Id. at 1.
145
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insurance plan that explicitly excluded all transition-related medical
care (including hormone therapy and gender confirmation surgery) for
people diagnosed with gender dysphoria.150
In January 2016, the case settled, with the defendant agreeing
to pay Ms. Austin $115,000 and issue her a written apology,
eliminating from its insurance plan all exclusions for transition-related
medical care, and providing additional antidiscrimination training for
employees.151
4.

Bost v. Sam’s East, Inc.

In Bost v. Sam’s East, Inc., Charlene Bost, a transgender
woman who worked at Sam’s Club (a subsidiary of Wal-Mart), sued
her employer under the ADA after enduring seven years of horrific
discrimination after transitioning on the job.152 According to her
complaint, Ms. Bost regularly experienced derogatory comments (such
as being called a “shim,” “thing,” and “faggot”), deliberate
misgendering, unfair discipline, and, ultimately, retaliatory
discharge.153
Because Ms. Bost did not assert in her complaint that she
presently had (or once had) gender dysphoria, her case is the first to
allege discrimination based solely on being perceived as having gender
dysphoria.154 People who transition are typically perceived as having
gender dysphoria because transition is the recognized form of medical
treatment for gender dysphoria.155
Wal-Mart settled the case in June 2018.156

150

Complaint in Intervention of Plaintiff/Intervenor Ms. Britney Austin at 1 & ¶¶ 103-113,
EEOC v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 0:15-cv-02646, 2015 WL 13283300 (D. Minn. Oct. 22,
2015). The plaintiff also brought suit under Title VII. Id. ¶¶ 144-98.
151 Press Release, U.S. Equal Opportunity Emp’t Comm’n, Deluxe Financial to Settle Sex
Discrimination Suit on Behalf of Transgender Employee (Jan. 21, 2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-21-16.cfm.
152 Amended Complaint ¶¶ 2-10, Bost v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-1148 (M.D.N.C.
Apr. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Bost Complaint]. Ms. Bost also brought suit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law. Id. ¶ 1.
153
Id. ¶ 80.
154 Id. ¶¶ 5, 65.
155 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing transition).
156 TLDEF Announces Settlement in Federal Lawsuit Against Sam’s East, Inc., and WalMart Associates, Inc., TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, http://transgenderlegal.org/h
eadline_show.php?id=945 (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).
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Schawe-Lane v. Amazon

In Schawe-Lane v. Amazon, a transgender woman, Allegra
Schawe-Lane, and her spouse, Dane Lane, a non-transgender man,
filed suit after experiencing unrelenting discrimination during their
employment at Amazon.157 As in Blatt, Parker, and Deluxe, Ms.
Schawe-Lane experienced intentional misgendering and a range of
epithets, such as “it,” “chick with a dick,” “shemale,” and “tranny
prostitute.”158 This humiliating name-calling quickly progressed to
intimidation and threats of physical violence. While Ms. Schawe-Lane
was using the women’s bathroom, a group of women entered. One of
the women loudly exclaimed, “It’s in here right now,” to which another
responded, “Maybe we should just drag it outside the fucking stall.”159
Ms. Schawe-Lane and Mr. Lane experienced similar threats from male
co-workers, who yelled that they “should get fucking fired, faggots!”
and should “get [their] ass beat.”160 Despite dozens of complaints to
Human Resources and, ultimately, the EEOC, the abuse continued,
culminating in a horrific incident involving someone tampering with
their car in Amazon’s secure parking lot.161
This case, which is the first to involve a claim of associational
discrimination (against Mr. Lane) based on gender dysphoria, is
pending.
B.

Prisoner Rights

The second type of case involves discrimination in the prison
context under Title II of the ADA and Section 504. In the following
cases, transgender people were denied access to proper medical care
and gender-appropriate facilities and programs. These cases highlight
the pernicious, stereotypical attitudes that people with gender
dysphoria often experience: discomfort with people with gender
dysphoria, who are often seen as neither male nor female, but rather

157 Complaint and Jury Demand ¶¶ 57-70, Schawe–Lane v. Amazon.com.KYDC LLC, No.
2:17-cv-00134 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Schawe-Lane Complaint]. The plaintiffs
also brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, and state law. Id. ¶ 1.
158 Id. ¶ 71.
159 Id. ¶ 77.
160 Id.
161 Id. ¶¶ 99-109.
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something in between—something less than human,162 and fear and
distrust of people with gender dysphoria, who are seen as imposters
trying to obtain an advantage through deception, iconoclasts trying to
undermine community norms, or predators trying to harm others.163
Because a disproportionate number of transgender people (one in six,
by one study) have been sentenced to prison,164 and because sex
discrimination statutes do not typically apply in prisons, the potential
impact of prisoner rights litigation under the ADA and Section 504 is
significant.
1.

Doe v. Massachusetts Department of
Correction

In Doe v. Massachusetts Department of Corrections, the
plaintiff, a transgender woman who is currently serving a sentence of
three to four years for a non-violent drug offense, sued the
Massachusetts Department of Correction and several of its officials for
incorrectly housing her in a men’s prison in violation of the ADA and
Section 504.165 As a woman incarcerated in an all-male prison facility,
the plaintiff faced serious, daily discrimination and degradation. She
was regularly subjected to dehumanizing strip searches by male
correctional officers.166 She was forced to shower in view of male
prisoners who inappropriately commented on her body and otherwise
harassed her.167 Correctional officers and other staff at the facility
refused to address or refer to the plaintiff using her correct name and
female pronouns.168 And the defendants refused the plaintiff’s
repeated requests to be transferred to a female corrections facility
162 See Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Corrected Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Defendants’
Motion for Clarification, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-12255, at 4 (D. Mass. Mar.
21, 2018) [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot. for Recon.] (stating that “one of the most pernicious
stereotypes about transgender people [is that they are] . . . neither male nor female”—they are
“less than human[,] . . . an objectified ‘it’ rather than a person”).
163 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing examples of discrimination
against people with gender dysphoria).
164 Transgender Incarcerated People in Crisis, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.
org/know-your-rights/article/trans-incarcerated-people (last visited Feb. 26, 2019); see also
Polices,
Jails,
Prisons,
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
TRANSGENDER
EQUALITY,
https://transequality.org/issues/police-jails-prisons (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).
165 Complaint ¶¶ 1-8, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255 (D. Mass. Nov. 15, 2017)
[hereinafter Doe v. Mass. Complaint]
166 Id. ¶ 5.
167 Id.
168 Id. ¶ 65.
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based not on an individualized assessment of actual risks, but rather on
the apparent discomfort of female inmates and guards.169
A group of disability rights, health and mental health law, and
transgender rights organizations submitted an amicus brief in support
of the plaintiff’s right to bring a claim under the ADA and Section 504,
marking the first time that disability and transgender rights
organizations have formally come together to advance ADA coverage
of gender dysphoria.170 “Analysis of the legislative history and text of
the ADA, as well as Supreme Court decisions interpreting the ADA
and its predecessor, Section 504,” amici argued, “compels inclusion of
people with gender dysphoria, who routinely experience
discrimination based on stigma, prejudice, and ignorance.”171
On March 5, 2018, in recognition of the daily harms inflicted
on the plaintiff, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction in part, ordering the defendants, where feasible, “to: (1)
utilize female corrections officers when conducting strip searches of
Doe; (2) to make permanent the arrangement permitting Doe to shower
at different times than male inmates; and (3) to station a corrections
officer as a privacy guard while Doe showered.”172
On June 14, 2018, the court denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.173 The court interpreted the ADA’s (and Section 504’s)
transgender exclusion as not applying to gender dysphoria for two
reasons: first, because gender dysphoria “may result from physical
causes”174 (the theory originally advanced by DOJ); and, second,

169

See Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, at 1-2 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2018)
(discussing “climate issues” among female inmates and objections from female guards).
170 Brief of Amici Curiae Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law et al., Doe v. Mass. Dep’t
of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-12255, at vii-ix (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2018).
171 Id. at 4.
172 Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, 2018 WL 2994403 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018)
(citing Order, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, at 5 (D. Mass. Mar. 5, 2018)).
173 Id. at *2. In addition to the plaintiff’s ADA and Section 504 claims, the court allowed
the plaintiff’s equal protection claim to proceed on grounds that the plaintiff had stated a claim
that the DOC’s actions were “based on sex” and “therefore subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny above the normal ‘rational basis’ test,” and were not “substantially related” to “an
important governmental interest.” Id. at *9-11. The court also allowed the plaintiff’s due
process claim to proceed on grounds that the plaintiff had stated a claim that she had
experienced “an atypical and significant hardship . . . as compared to other inmates in the
Massachusetts prison system” without due process. Id. at *11-12.
174 Id. at *6 (“While medical research in this area remains in its initial phases, Doe points
to recent studies demonstrating that GD diagnoses have a physical etiology, namely hormonal
and genetic drivers contributing to the in utero development of dysphoria.”).
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because gender dysphoria “is not merely another term for ‘gender
identity disorder,’” but is rather a distinct diagnosis with different
diagnostic criteria175 (the theory originally advanced by amici in Blatt).
This is the first time that a court has adopted either theory of coverage
of gender dysphoria; the Blatt court reached the same result by
different reasoning.176
A contrary interpretation, the court concluded, may well violate
equal protection.177 Invoking the “heightened judicial sensitivity”
required for classifications of “discrete and insular minorities,” the
court suggested that the ADA’s transgender exclusion was
“constitutionally suspect.”178 According to the court:
The pairing of gender identity disorders with conduct
that is criminal or viewed by society as immoral or lewd
raises a serious question as to the light in which the
drafters of this exclusion viewed transgender
persons.179
Such an exclusion was particularly concerning, the court
added, given the remedial purpose of the ADA, “which is to redress
discrimination against individuals with disabilities based on antiquated
or prejudicial conceptions of how they came to their station in life.”180
In addition to other “firsts,” Doe v. Massachusetts Department of
175 Id. (“In contrast to DSM-IV, which had defined ‘gender identity disorder’ as
characterized by a ‘strong and persistent cross gender-identification’ and a ‘persistent
discomfort’ with one’s sex or ‘sense of inappropriateness’ in a given gender role, the diagnosis
of GD in DSM-V requires attendant disabling physical symptoms, in addition to
manifestations of clinically significant emotional distress.”); see also id. (expressing
agreement with plaintiff’s argument that “the decision to treat ‘Gender Dysphoria’ in DSM-V
as a freestanding diagnosis is more than a semantic refinement. Rather, it reflects an evolving
re-evaluation by the medical community of transgender issues and the recognition that GD
involves far more than a person’s gender identification.”); see also Jane Doe’s Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, at 13-14 (D.
Mass. Feb. 2, 2018) (“Unlike the outdated diagnosis of gender identity disorder, the hallmark
or presenting feature of Gender Dysphoria is not a person’s gender identity. Rather, it is the
clinically significant distress, termed dysphoria, that some people experience as a result of the
mismatch between a person’s gender identity and their assigned sex. Reflecting this
distinction, the diagnostic criteria for Gender Dysphoria in the DSM-V are different than those
for gender identity disorder.”).
176 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing Blatt decision).
177
Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *7.
178 Id. (citing footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)).
179 See id. (quoting Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896), for the proposition that “the Constitution, properly interpreted, ‘neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens’”).
180 Id. at *8.
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Correction marks the first time that a court has addressed the
constitutionality of the ADA’s transgender exclusion.
Having determined that gender dysphoria is not excluded by
the ADA and Section 504, the court went on to conclude that the
plaintiff had stated a claim for disparate treatment, disparate impact,
and failure to accommodate under the ADA and Section 504.
“[U]nlike other female inmates, [the plaintiff] was assigned to a men’s
prison by virtue of her gender assignment at birth and denied access to
facilities and programs that would correspond with her gender
identification,” thereby stating a claim for disparate treatment.181
Additionally, “the DOC’s biological sex-based assignment policy has
a disparate impact on inmates with GD because it injects them into a
prison environment that is contrary to a critical aspect of their
prescribed treatment (that they be allowed to live as, in Doe’s case, a
woman).”182 Lastly, “Doe has adequately pled that she has been denied
the reasonable accommodation of a transfer to a woman’s prison, as
well as that she be addressed by prison personnel in a manner
consistent with her gender identity.”183
The court concluded its decision with a strong endorsement of
the viability of the plaintiff’s claims: “As may be apparent from this
decision, the court is of the view that Doe may very well prevail on her
ADA [and Section 504] . . . claims.” 184 In September 2018, the DOC
transferred the plaintiff to a woman’s correctional facility, marking the
first time in history that a transgender woman was transferred from a
men’s facility to a woman’s facility.185 Significantly, Massachusetts
and Connecticut recently enacted laws that require this result.186
This case is pending.
181

Id.
Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at *12.
185 Michael Levenson, Transgender Inmate Moved to Women’s Prison, BOSTON GLOBE
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/01/24/transgender-inmate-movedwomen-prison/Nf2k5Oqa3Ojnh1yH1IwWkL/story.html.
186 See MASS. GEN. LAWS 127 § 32A (2018) (“A prisoner of a correctional institution, jail
or house of correction that has a gender identity . . . that differs from the prisoner’s sex assigned
at birth, with or without a diagnosis of gender dysphoria or any other physical or mental health
diagnosis, shall be,” inter alia, “housed in a correctional facility with inmates with the same
gender identity.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-81ii (2018) (“An inmate who has a birth certificate,
passport or driver’s license that reflects his or her gender identity or who can meet established
standards for obtaining such a document to confirm the inmate’s gender identity shall
presumptively be placed in a correctional institution with inmates of the gender consistent with
the inmate’s gender identity.”).
182
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Doe v. Dzurenda

In Doe v. Dzurenda, the plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old
transgender girl who was in the care and custody of Connecticut’s
Department of Children and Families (DCF), sued the Department for
discrimination under the ADA and Section 504.187 According to the
complaint, DCF placed her in solitary confinement for nearly three
months at an adult woman’s prison—even though the plaintiff was
never charged with or convicted of an adult crime.188 DCF eventually
transferred the plaintiff to an appropriate facility for juvenile
delinquent girls.189 Less than one month later, however, after a fight
with several other girls, DCF transferred the plaintiff to a high-security
facility for juvenile delinquent boys, where she was held in solitary
confinement for seven more months.190 None of the other girls
involved in the fight, all of whom were observed hitting each other and
staff, were transferred or placed in solitary confinement.191
As a result of her isolation, the plaintiff had no interaction with
other youth and no access to age-appropriate mental health,
educational, and rehabilitative services provided to other inmates.192
In addition, staff members at the facility for delinquent boys routinely
referred to the plaintiff using a male pronoun and her male given name,
and refused to permit the plaintiff to express herself as a girl by
wearing her own clothes, make-up, or a wig.193 Although DCF
justified its extraordinary confinement of the plaintiff based on her
purported dangerousness, DCF did not similarly confine other youth
with histories of misbehavior and assaultive conduct.194 Indeed, the
plaintiff was the only youth that DCF isolated alone in a unit for many
months based on dangerousness.195

187 Complaint at 1 & ¶ 1, Doe v. Dzurenda, No. 3:16-cv-01934 (D. Conn. Nov. 23, 2016)
[hereinafter Dzurenda Complaint]. The plaintiff also brought suit under the Eighth
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment (due process), the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act, and the Prison Rape Elimination Act. Id. ¶ 1.
188 Id. ¶ 1.
189 Id. ¶ 2.
190
Id. ¶¶ 1, 93.
191 Id. ¶ 94.
192 Id. ¶¶ 2, 88.
193 Id. ¶¶ 57, 101, 107.
194 Id. ¶¶ 94, 107.
195 Id.
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At oral argument on September 19, 2017, counsel for the State
of Connecticut appeared to concede that gender dysphoria was not
excluded by the ADA.196 This case is pending.
3.

Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Correction

In Edmo v. Idaho Department of Correction, Adree Edmo, an
incarcerated transgender woman sued the Idaho Department of
Corrections for discrimination in violation of the ADA and Section
504.197 Prior to her incarceration, Ms. Edmo, who is Native American,
lived as a woman and was recognized by her Tribe as “Two-Spirit,” a
Native American concept encompassing cross-gender identifying and
gender nonconforming individuals.198
Approximately three months after her incarceration, Ms. Edmo
was diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a doctor retained by the
Department.199 Notwithstanding this diagnosis, the Department denied
her access to appropriate medical treatment, including access to
feminizing hormones, evaluation for sex affirming surgery, and being
respected as a woman (for example, by having access to women’s
clothing and commissary items) while incarcerated.200 Instead, the
Department repeatedly punished Ms. Edmo for expressing her female
gender identity, including subjecting her to solitary confinement.201 As
a result of the Department’s failure to adequately treat her gender
dysphoria, Ms. Edmo experienced severe symptoms related to this
condition, tragically resulting in one suicide attempt and two attempts
to self-castrate.202 The Department also refused Ms. Edmo’s requests
to be transferred from her current unit—where she was sexually
assaulted two years earlier, and which posed known risks to her
safety—to protective custody.203
196

See Minute Entry, Doe v. Dzurenda, No. 3:16-cv-01934 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2017)
(noting oral argument on Defs.’ motion to dismiss).
197 Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1-8, Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-00151
(D. Idaho Sept. 1, 2017), [hereinafter Edmo Complaint]. In addition to her disability
discrimination claims, Ms. Edmo brought claims under the 8th Amendment, 14th Amendment
(sex discrimination and disability discrimination in violation of equal protection), Affordable
Care Act (sex discrimination), and state law. Id. ¶ 7.
198
Id. ¶¶ 37-38.
199 Id. ¶ 40
200 See id. ¶ 54.
201 Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
202 Id. ¶ 5.
203 Id. ¶¶ 6, 57.
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On June 7, 2018, the court denied, inter alia, the Department’s
motion to dismiss Ms. Edmo’s ADA claim.204 Responding to the
Department’s invocation of the ADA’s transgender exclusion, the
court stated simply: “[T]he issue of whether Edmo’s diagnosis falls
under a specific exclusion of the ADA presents a genuine dispute of
material fact in this case. Therefore, Edmo’s ADA claim will not be
dismissed.”205 Several months later, on December 13, 2018, the court
granted Ms. Edmo’s motion for preliminary injunction on Eighth
Amendment grounds and ordered the Department to provide Ms.
Edmo “with adequate medical care, including gender confirmation
surgery.”206
This case is pending.
4.

Tate v. Wexford Health Services, Inc.

In Tate v. Wexford Health Services, Inc., the plaintiff, a
transgender woman with several medical diagnoses, including gender
dysphoria, sued prison officials and the medical provider for the
Illinois Department of Corrections for violating the ADA.207 Housed
in various male correctional facilities, the plaintiff regularly
experienced taunts and other harassment from corrections officers and
inmates.208 Despite being raped and physically and sexually assaulted
while incarcerated, the plaintiff was denied protective housing or
transfer to housing with other women, and was instead forced to spend
many hours in what was effectively solitary confinement.209 And, like
the plaintiffs in Doe v. Massachusetts Department of Correction,
Dzurenda, and Edmo, the plaintiff in Tate was denied access to
appropriate treatment for her gender dysphoria, including medical
evaluation for sex affirming surgery and equal treatment as a woman,
including access to women’s clothing and commissary items.210
This case is pending.
204

Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-00151-BLW, 2018 WL 2745898, at *10 (D.
Idaho, June 7, 2018).
205 Id. at *8.
206 Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-00151-BLW, 2018 WL 6571203, at *19 (D.
Idaho Dec. 13, 2018).
207 Plaintiff Carl Tate’s Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1, 18-27, Tate v. Wexford Health
Servs., Inc., No. 3:16-cv-92 (S.D. Ill. June 19, 2018).
208 Id. ¶¶ 19, 30-33.
209 Id. ¶¶ 24, 29.
210 Id. ¶¶ 35-49, 57-60.
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Pro Se Prisoner Cases

In addition to the above cases, all of which involve plaintiffs
represented by counsel, several transgender prisoners have brought
ADA challenges pro se. Not surprisingly, the courts in these cases
summarily concluded in a single sentence, without any analysis
whatsoever, that gender dysphoria was excluded by the ADA.211
Unlike Blatt, these decisions contained no analysis of whether the
ADA’s transgender exclusion applies to the new diagnosis of gender
dysphoria, nor whether the exclusion violates equal protection.212
Furthermore, the courts that reached these decisions did not have the
benefit of a statement of interest filed by DOJ, which concluded that
gender dysphoria is not excluded from the ADA, or an amicus brief
filed by state and national transgender rights organizations, which
argued the same.213 For these reasons, the pro se prisoner decisions
have little interpretive value.
C.

Insurance and Identity Documents

The third type of case involves discrimination in the provision
of insurance and identity documents under Titles II and III of the ADA
and Section 504. In the following cases, transgender people or their
family members were provided with insurance plans that excluded
coverage of transition-related medical care, and birth certificates that
recorded “sex” based solely on the person’s original designation,
thereby wrongly designating sex for transgender persons. These cases
well illustrate the society-wide neglect of transgender people, for
whom society’s institutions were not designed, and whose health and
safety society has systematically ignored.214 Because many insurance
plans continue to deny coverage for transition-related care,215 and
211 See Gulley-Fernandez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., No. 15-CV-995, 2015 WL 7777997, at *3
(E.D. Wis. Dec. 1, 2015); In re Outman v. Annucci, 19 N.Y.S.3d 678, 684 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
212 See supra notes 94-99, 102-09 and accompanying text (discussing arguments raised in
Blatt).
213 See supra notes 113, 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ statements of
interest and amicus briefs supporting coverage of gender dysphoria).
214 See supra Part II (discussing, inter alia, neglect of people with gender dysphoria); see
also Feldblum, supra note 35, at 181-82 (discussing neglect of people with disabilities, Jewish
people, and LGBT people).
215 NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER
SURVEY, supra note 51, at 2 (surveying 27,715 transgender people across the nation, and
finding that “[o]ne in four (25%) respondents experienced a problem in the past year with their
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because at least twenty states have laws that preclude many
transgender people from securing accurate birth certificates,216 the
potential impact of these cases is significant.
1.

Doe v. Arrisi

In Doe v. Arrisi, the plaintiff, a transgender woman, challenged
a New Jersey law that required proof of gender confirmation surgery
in order to change the sex classification on her birth certificate.217 Like
many people with gender dysphoria for whom such surgery is
unnecessary, contraindicated, or infeasible, the plaintiff transitioned
without surgery.218 As a result, the sex designation on her birth
certificate is inaccurate.219 Although she was classified as “male” at
birth, she is female, having undergone gender transition. Specifically,
she has undergone hormone therapy, which means that she has sex
hormones circulating in her body that are comparable to those of a
woman who was assigned the female sex at birth, and, as a result of
such therapy, she has female secondary sex characteristics comparable
to those of non-transgender women.220
The consequences of such discrimination, plaintiff argued, are
significant. An inaccurate birth certificate discloses to all the world
that the person is transgender and accordingly exposes that person to

insurance related to being transgender, such as being denied coverage for care related to gender
transition or being denied coverage for routine care because they were transgender. . . . More
than half (55%) of those who sought coverage for transition-related surgery in the past year
were denied, and 25% of those who sought coverage for hormones in the past year were
denied.”).
216 Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-By-State Guidelines, LAMBDA
LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/article/trans-changing-birth-certificat
e-sex-designations (last updated Sept. 17, 2018) (collecting state statutes regarding changing
sex designations on birth certificates).
217 Amended Complaint ¶¶ 4, 15, 41, Doe v. Arrisi, No. 3:16-cv-08640 (D.N.J. Sept. 22,
2017) [hereinafter Arrisi Complaint]. The plaintiff also brought suit under the Fourteenth
Amendment (due process, and sex and disability discrimination in violation of equal
protection), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. ¶ 15.
218 Brief of Amici Curiae Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom et al., Doe v. Arrisi,
No. 3:16-cv-08640, at 2, 9 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Arrisi Amicus Brief]; see also
Arrisi Complaint, supra note 217, ¶¶ 78, 88.
219 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 218, at 11; see also Arrisi Complaint, supra note 217, ¶
89.
220 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 218, at 11; see also Arrisi Complaint, supra note 217, ¶
57.
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the risk of violence and other adverse treatment.221 To avoid such
disclosure, some transgender people may seek invasive surgery that is
not otherwise medically indicated or may even be contraindicated.222
Such discrimination therefore places some individuals in a double
bind: transition without surgery and risk violence and other adverse
treatment, or undergo invasive medical surgery that one otherwise
would not need in order to avoid such risk.223
Citing “a lengthy history of societal prejudice and neglect”
shared by people with disabilities and transgender people, a group of
transgender rights and health organizations filed an amicus brief
supporting coverage of gender dysphoria under the ADA and Section
504, generally, as well as the plaintiff’s right to amend her birth
certificate without undergoing surgery, specifically.224 The amicus
brief also advanced three separate theories for why the surgery
requirement was discriminatory: it was intentionally discriminatory
because it denied an accurate birth certificate to a subclass of people
with gender dysphoria (disparate treatment); it was discriminatory in
effect because it screened out a subclass of people with gender
dysphoria from obtaining an accurate birth certificate (disparate
impact); and the State of New Jersey failed to reasonably modify the
surgery requirement for a subclass of people with gender dysphoria.225
221

Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 218, at 13-14; see also Arrisi Complaint, supra note
217, ¶¶ 14, 59-62; see also JAIME GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 138, 154 (2011), https://issuu.com/translib
eralprism/docs/ntds_report__full_228_pages (“Legal and bureaucratic barriers to amending
transgender people’s identity documents marginalize and stigmatize transgender people. . . .
Whenever people with incongruent identification documents must produce them, they are
potentially revealed as transgender, whether to an employer, clerk, police officer, or airport
personnel. Each of these ‘outings’ presents the possibility for disrespect, harassment,
discrimination or violence.”); accord Adkins v. City of N.Y., 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“A mismatch between the gender indicated on the [birth certificate] and the
gender of the holder calls down discrimination.”).
222 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 218, at 13-14; see also Arrisi Complaint, supra note
217, ¶ 82.
223 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 220, at 14. In recognition of the negative consequences
of inaccurate birth certificates for people who do not need or undergo SRS, the American
Medical Association has called for the “elimination of any requirement that individuals
undergo gender affirmation surgery in order to change their sex designation on birth
certificates and supports modernizing state vital statistics statutes to ensure accurate gender
markers on birth certificates.” AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CONFORMING BIRTH
CERTIFICATE POLICIES TO CURRENT MEDICAL STANDARDS FOR TRANSGENDER PATIENTS H65.967 (2014), https://policysearch.amaassn.org/policyfinder/detail/transgender%20?uri=%2
FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-5096.xml.
224 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 218, at 4.
225 Id. at 9-22.
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Citing Justice Thurgood Marshall’s partial concurrence in Cleburne,
amici argued that New Jersey’s surgery requirement represented a
“case of what once was a ‘natural’ and ‘self-evident’ ordering” coming
to be seen as “an artificial and invidious constraint on human potential
and freedom. Shifting cultural, political, and social patterns,” they
argued, had made past practices “inconsistent with fundamental
principles upon which American society rests.”226
The State of New Jersey asserted that the surgery requirement
was necessary to “ensur[e] accuracy in vital records and reduc[e] the
likelihood that vital records are used for fraudulent purposes.”227
Despite these assertions of necessity, on July 3, 2018, New Jersey
Governor Phil Murphy signed legislation removing the requirement.228
The previous governor, Governor Chris Christie, twice vetoed the
legislation, calling it “beyond the pale.”229
2.

Doe v. United States

In Doe v. United States, the parents of a transgender boy, one
of whom was a colonel in the United States Armed Forces, sued the
federal government and its health insurance program on behalf of their
son for categorically denying coverage to service members and their
families for “[a]ll services and supplies directly or indirectly related to
transsexualism or such other conditions as gender dysphoria” in
violation of Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (“Section 1557”).230 Section 1557 prohibits federally-funded
health insurance programs from, among other things, engaging in
disability discrimination prohibited by Section 504.231 According to
the plaintiffs, the defendants’ categorical exclusion violated Section
226 Id. at 2 (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 466 (U.S. 1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., which overturned Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” doctrine).
227 Brief on Behalf of Defendants in Support of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint in Lieu of Answer, Doe v. Arrisi, No. 3:16-cv-08640, at 1 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017).
228 Alanna Vagianos, New Jersey Gov. Signs Bills Giving Transgender Residents More
Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (July 4, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-jerseygov-signs-bills-transgender-rights_us_5b3cbee9e4b09e4a8b291569.
229 See Arrisi Complaint, supra note 217, ¶ 91.
230 Complaint ¶¶ 1-12, Doe v. United States, No. 3:16-cv-640 (S.D. Ill. June 14, 2016)
[hereinafter Doe v. U.S. Complaint].
231 Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-1557/index.html
(last updated Apr. 25, 2018).
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1557 by denying coverage of puberty-blocking medications for the
treatment of gender dysphoria while at the same time providing
coverage of those same medications for the treatment of other
conditions, such as prostate cancer and endometriosis.232
Doe v. United States marked the first time that a plaintiff
challenged the denial of insurance coverage for the treatment of gender
dysphoria as “disability” discrimination under Section 1557. As a
result of a 2016 injunction in a case out of the Northern District of
Texas,233 currently pending before the Fifth Circuit, the viability of
challenging transgender discrimination as “sex” discrimination under
Section 1557 remains in flux. This case settled in February 2017.
3.

Manning v. McGettigan

In Manning v. McGettigan, the plaintiff, a transgender man
who was employed by the IRS, requested pre-authorization for chest
surgery—a common surgery to treat gender dysphoria in transgender
persons transitioning from female to male.234 Aetna, the federal
employee health insurance carrier, denied pre-authorization on
grounds that such surgery is an unnecessary, “cosmetic” procedure.235
The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Office of Personnel
Management, which is responsible for an insurance carrier’s denial of
benefits, alleging, among other things, discrimination under Section
504.236 Specifically, the plaintiff argued that Aetna’s exclusion of the
procedure for people with gender dysphoria, but not for people with
other diagnoses (including for cancer survivors), is discrimination
based on disability.237 OPM dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiff

232

Doe v. U.S. Complaint, supra note 230, ¶¶ 4-7, 84. The plaintiff also alleged sex
discrimination and associational discrimination under Section 1557, as well as violations of
the Fifth Amendment (due process, and sex and disability discrimination in violation of equal
protection). Id. ¶ 12.
233 On December 31, 2016, in Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas enjoined enforcement of the Department of Health and
Human Service’s regulation interpreting Section 1557’s prohibition on “sex” discrimination
to include discrimination based on “gender identity.” Section 1557 of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, supra note 231.
234 Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Notice of Appeal at 2, Manning v. OPM, No. 0120161068
(E.E.O.C. Mar. 17, 2016).
235 Id. at 2.
236 Id. at 2 & n.3.
237 Id.
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appealed the denial to the EEOC.238 In response, OPM invoked
Section 504’s transgender exclusion in support of dismissal of the
plaintiff’s appeal.239
On March 6, 2017, the EEOC reversed OPM’s dismissal and
required OPM to process the plaintiff’s claim.240 Significantly, the
EEOC rejected OPM’s argument that gender dysphoria is excluded
from the ADA. Instead, in a footnote to the decision, the EEOC
determined that an individual who alleges that “gender dysphoria
results from a physical impairment . . . states a claim” under the
Rehabilitation Act.241 The EEOC’s determination in Manning is
significant, given its decision in 1994, in Bell v. Shalala, dismissing a
transgender federal employee’s disability discrimination claim based,
in part, on Section 504’s exclusion of “transsexualism.”242
4.

Musgrove v. Board of Regents

Similarly, in Musgrove v. Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia, the plaintiff, a transgender man who is employed
by the University of Georgia, sued the University and its health and
disability insurance carriers, Blue Cross Blue Shield and MetLife, for
their refusal to cover the costs of his chest surgery and other gender
dysphoria-related treatments in violation of the ADA and Section
504.243 According to the plaintiff, the defendants’ exclusion of
coverage of medically necessary and effective medical procedures for
the treatment of gender dysphoria, while covering the same procedures
for other diagnoses, reflected “the historical stigmatization of his
medical condition.”244 Importantly, Musgrove is the first case to allege
discrimination against insurers (under ADA Titles I and III and
Section 504), in addition to employers (under ADA Titles I and II and
238

Id. at 4.
Manning v. McGettigan, E.E.O.C. App. No. 0120161068, at 4-5 n.3 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 6,
2017).
240 Id. at 5.
241 Id. at 4-5 n.3.
242 Bell v. Shalala, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 01941146, 1994 WL 1755505, at *3 & n.3
(E.E.O.C. Sept. 9, 1994) (citing EEOC’s ADA regulations excluding “transsexualism,” 29
C.F.R. § 1630.3(d)(1)).
243 Complaint for Damages ¶¶ 44-61, Musgrove v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
No. 3:18-cv-00080 (M.D. Ga. June 28, 2018). The plaintiff also brought suit under Title VII,
Title IX, and the Fourteenth Amendment (disability, sex, and transgender status discrimination
in violation of equal protection). Id. ¶ 6.
244 Id. ¶¶ 2, 44.
239
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Section 504), for excluding coverage of treatments for gender
dysphoria.
V.

CONCLUSION

For over a quarter of a century, the ADA and its predecessor,
Section 504, excluded transgender people from antidiscrimination
protection based on disability. While tearing down one “shameful wall
of exclusion” for people with disabilities, these laws erected another—
denying transgender people the very “opportunity to blend fully and
equally into the rich mosaic of the American mainstream” that was
promised to others with stigmatized medical conditions.245 This
Article has examined the shameful history of the ADA’s and Section
504’s transgender exclusion, the advocacy that led to disability rights
protection for gender dysphoria in a range of settings, and the impact
these cases will have in redressing the prejudice, stereotypes, and
societal neglect experienced by people with gender dysphoria.

245

Remarks of President George Bush at the Signing of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, supra note 41.

